One Philosopher’s Case for a Flawed Universe

In a 2016 article, Ghasem Pourhasan explores Suhrawardi’s metaphysics of light.

The problem of evil typically manifests in two forms. The logical problem asserts a direct contradiction: an omnipotent God could prevent evil, an omniscient God would know how, and an omnibenevolent God would want to. Since evil exists, such a God with all three of those attributes cannot, if the argument is sound. The evidential problem, on the other hand, contends that the sheer quantity and horrific nature of evil we observe make the existence of such a God highly improbable, even if not strictly irrational. Theistic responses often seek to show compatibility or offer justifications for why we might expect God to permit evil in the manner and to the extremes we observe.

Iranian philosopher professor Ghasem Pourhasan published a 2016 article examining the work of 12th-century Persian philosopher Suhrawardi, who utilized a metaphysics of light and darkness, where God is the "Light of Lights," the ultimate source of good.¹ Evil, in this context, often relates to a deficiency or absence of this divine light. Suhrawardi's approach offers several philosophical bases to address the problem of evil.

Pourhasan examines Suhrawardi's key arguments, as outlined in the provided analysis that follows, and I'll offer possible rebuttals or counterpoints that should be worth exploring more in depth at a later time.

1. The best system?:
   Suhrawardi argues against a purely human-centered view of good and evil. What seems evil to us, from our limited perspective, might be part of a larger cosmic good within the "best system". He suggests that if we could see the whole universe, our perception of evil might change. The world, with its current mix, might be the most optimal that God could create. Suhrawardi also maintained that good is more prevalent than evil.
   Critics might argue that dismissing human suffering as merely a matter of limited perspective can feel callous. The reality of an individual's pain is not necessarily negated by appeals to an unseen, greater cosmic good. A "best system" argument risks being unfalsifiable. How can we verify that this world, with its tsunamis, genocides, and childhood cancers, is truly the best an omnipotent being could conjure? Without a benchmark for comparison or clear criteria, it remains an assertion.
   Even if good generally outweighs evil, the intensity and horrific nature of certain evils (e.g., the Holocaust, the suffering of children) lead skeptics to question if this "best system" is consistent with infinite goodness and power. Is a system that includes such horrors truly the "best"?

2. Evil as a necessary precondition for higher goods:
   Suhrawardi posits that certain evils are necessary for "higher goods" like courage, compassion, and resilience to exist. Without pain or danger, virtues such as sympathy or bravery would have no context in which to develop or be expressed. Thus, permitting some evil is justified by the greater goods it makes possible.
   It seems easy to be incredulous to believe that the amount and intensity of suffering observed truly necessary for the cultivation of these virtues. Surely, an omnipotent God could foster such virtues with significantly less, or different kinds of, suffering. The link between, for example, a child dying of a painful disease and the moral growth of onlookers can seem tenuous and ethically troubling.
   Some evils are so devastating ("horrendous evils") that they seem to crush individuals rather than build character. Does extreme, soul-destroying suffering genuinely contribute to a "higher good," or does it simply destroy? If God is truly all-powerful, why are His options for character-building limited to methods that involve such intense suffering rather than alternative paths to moral and spiritual development that are less reliant on pain and loss?

3. The Nature of evil is non-being?:
   Suhrawardi, like Augustine, argued that evil is not a created substance but a "non-being" ( a privation or absence of good, much like darkness is the absence of light). God, being pure good, creates only good; evil arises from imperfection or the lack of some due good. This view avoids making God the author of evil.
   Critics often argue that calling evil a "privation" is a semantic distinction that doesn't diminish its painful reality. Whether tooth decay is a "presence of decay" or an "absence of dental health," the pain and damage are the same. The label doesn't make the experience less real or less problematic. The question merely shifts from "Why does God create/allow evil?" to "Why does God create/allow such profound privations of good?" If evil is a corruption or deficiency within an otherwise good creation, who is responsible for creating a system where such deficiencies can occur so devastatingly and frequently?

4. The permissibility of "little evil":
   Suhrawardi divided contingent beings into categories based on their good and evil content, arguing that a world with "much good and little evil" (the second type) is permissible. Purely evil beings, or those where evil equals or outweighs good, are not created. Suhrawardi argues that questioning why God didn’t create a world without evil is flawed, as it demands things be other than their essence (e.g., fire that doesn’t burn). A purely good world would either prevent creation (limiting divine grace), alter the universe’s ecstatic nature, or exclude essential attributes, violating necessity. Thus, minimal evil is necessary for the world’s existence. If God avoided creation because of lesser evils would be permitted, then that would be a moral failure on the part of God.
   The argument that this would mean the object "must not be itself" can sound like a limitation on omnipotence or a concession that some evil is inherently necessary for material existence, which brings back earlier questions. For some skeptics, the permission of any evil by an all-good and all-powerful being is problematic, regardless of whether it's quantitatively less than perfect goodness. It seems unjust that those who suffer the brunt of evil can be used as a means for the betterment of the whole.

5. The higher seeks nothing from the lower:
   This principle suggests that God, as the ultimate, self-sufficient reality, does not act out of need or gain from creation. Human attempts to fully grasp divine motives are limited by our finite understanding. What appears as problematic evil to us might have reasons within the divine plan that are beyond our comprehension.
   While acknowledging divine mystery is a staple of many theistic traditions, critics argue that it can function as a way to deflect difficult questions rather than answer them. If any problematic evil can be attributed to "mysterious divine ways," then the problem isn't solved so much as sidestepped. If God's reasons for allowing horrific suffering are entirely beyond our moral understanding, in what sense can we call God "good"? If we cannot trust our deepest moral intuitions about what constitutes unacceptable suffering, it can undermine our ability to engage in moral reasoning about God's actions or nature.

Enduring questions

The philosophical responses to the problem of evil, such as those offered by Suhrawardi, demonstrate a profound intellectual effort to reconcile faith with the harsh realities of the world.

However, as the skeptical counter-points highlight, these explanations are not without their own significant challenges. They often raise further questions about justice, divine power, our place in the world and the very nature of good and evil. These are questions I struggle with and, in some cases, think there are successful responses to. But this is an ongoing dialogue, with its complex arguments and counter-arguments, underscores the quest to make sense of suffering in a world believed to be under the care of a benevolent Creator.

Image credit

1. Shahrokhi, Reza. “An Analysis and Evaluation of Philosophical Bases of School of Illumination in Terms of Problem of Evil.” Academia.edu, 2023. https://www.academia.edu/128253730/An_Analysis_and_Evaluation_of_Philosophical_Bases_of_School_of_Illumination_in_Terms_of_Problem_of_Evil.