The problem in 'Evil is Not Evidence' is not uniquely evidential. It is not just an epistemic problem. It is true in S5 alone--without any epistemic assumptions--that there is no state of affairs with which the classical God is not compossible. So, the evidential result confirms the metaphysical result in S5 alone. Maybe Wittgenstein was right that God and everything else philosophers regard as the most important features of our world are not among the objects 'in' the world. They do not exist in any world as all of the confirmable and disconfirmable propositions and objects do.
The problem in 'Evil is Not Evidence' is not uniquely evidential. It is not just an epistemic problem. It is true in S5 alone--without any epistemic assumptions--that there is no state of affairs with which the classical God is not compossible. So, the evidential result confirms the metaphysical result in S5 alone. Maybe Wittgenstein was right that God and everything else philosophers regard as the most important features of our world are not among the objects 'in' the world. They do not exist in any world as all of the confirmable and disconfirmable propositions and objects do.