The paper “Salvation in Heaven?” presents a dilemma the authors call the “The Problem of Heaven” for theological defenses that use free will to justify the presence of evil.1 The argument challenges orthodox Christian beliefs about the afterlife by suggesting a contradiction between freedom and a guaranteed sinless Heaven. This response focuses on the second premise of the authors’ nine-part argument: “If there is morally significant freedom in Heaven, then it is not the case that, necessarily, there is no evil in Heaven.”
This premise rests on a specific definition of libertarian freedom. Along with the first premise, which states “Necessarily, there is no evil in Heaven,” the authors—Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis—argue implicitly that a free choice is “morally significant” only when the agent could have chosen evil. From this, they conclude that a necessarily evil-free Heaven must also be a Heaven without morally significant freedom. This conclusion, they argue, undermines the free-will defense of evil.
The “Problem of Heaven” rests on a flawed definition of libertarian freedom. An examination of God’s own freedom as a model for perfected human freedom, and a clarification of the human will’s purpose, shows that the absence of evil in Heaven perfects, rather than eliminates, morally significant freedom.
A clarification on orthodox belief
Orthodox Christianity holds to a doctrine of two creations. The first is the current Heaven and Earth, where evil is possible—Scripture depicts angels rebelling in Heaven. The second creation is the “new Heaven and new Earth” (Isaiah 65:17, Revelation 21:1), which will be inhabited by those who have completed their sanctification. In this second creation, sin will be impossible. The authors mention this possibility that “Heaven is a spatiotemporally separate “universe.’” For the sake of argument, this response grants the authors’ focus and takes “Heaven” to mean this second, perfected creation.
Critiquing the definition of freedom
The authors’ argument hinges on a specific definition of freedom. They contend that a choice is morally significant only if it involves the risk of choosing evil. Without this risk, freedom loses its value. This definition is incorrect. Libertarian freedom requires that an agent could have acted otherwise in the same circumstances. A libertarian free agent can choose to do good or to do something that is not good. This does not mean that the alternative action must be evil. Since God could choose not to act at all with respect to creation, the range of “not good” actions is wider than evil alone.
The case of God demonstrates this. In orthodox theology, God possesses perfect libertarian freedom, yet He cannot sin or choose evil because His nature is identical to The Good. His freedom is not expressed by choosing between good and evil, but by choosing among genuinely possible goods.2 For example, the choice to create the universe, to grant creatures free will, or to offer redemption were all free choices with immense moral weight. God could have refrained from creating, or created differently. He faced genuine alternatives and chose one. The moral significance of His choices comes from their consequences, not from a risk of failure.
The same logic applies to the sanctified will in Heaven. Evil is a privation—an absence of the good that ought to be present. The ability to choose evil is not a positive capacity but a defect in an imperfect will. A perfected, sanctified will is one that has been healed of this defect. It is no longer capable of choosing privation over substance. Like God, a sanctified person is not less free because they cannot choose evil; they are more free because their will is no longer hindered by the defects that make evil a possibility. Their freedom is exercised in choosing among the potentially infinite varieties of good, which is the proper end of the human will.
The cooperative nature of sanctification
If a perfectly ordered will is more free, one might ask why God does not grant it to everyone at conception, thereby avoiding moral evil entirely. The authors suggest that if God can perfect a person’s character after death, He could have created it perfect from the start.
This objection misunderstands the process of sanctification and the purpose of earthly freedom. The ultimate good for human beings is not merely possessing a perfect character or living a care-free comfortable life, but entering into a freely chosen, loving relationship with God. If God were to create beings who were psychologically incapable of choosing anything but The Good (God), their connection to God would be automatic, not authentic. Their actions would be an extension of God’s will, not a mutual response of love.
Therefore, freedom on Earth is the prerequisite for this relationship. Sanctification is a cooperative process. God does not override the will. Rather, when a will freely orients itself toward God but lacks the strength to achieve its end, God’s grace supplies what is missing. This act is consensual. The Holy Spirit works within a person to fill the voids in the will where sin and distortion take root. A student who desires to learn depends on a teacher to fill the void of ignorance with knowledge. This assistance does not coerce the student; it empowers the student’s pre-existing desire. Similarly, God’s grace fills the voids in our will, empowering us to freely achieve the good that our will already chose but was unable to complete on its own.
A character perfected by divine fiat, without a history of freely made choices, would be inauthentic. The process of orienting the will toward God, even imperfectly, creates a unique good: the good of a creature choosing a relationship with its creator. This history makes the final, perfected state meaningful.
Possible rebuttals
The illusion of cooperation: An objector might argue this “cooperative” process masks divine determinism. If God is the ultimate cause of the sanctified person’s final state, the human’s role seems passive.
Response: While God is the ultimate cause of all being, this does not eliminate the human will as the proximate cause of its own acts. God’s grace is not deterministic. With respect to the object of creation, grace is contingent on the will’s free orientation. It does not create a good will from nothing; it heals and elevates a will that, through its own free acts, has turned toward Him.
Equivocating on freedom: One could claim this response solves the problem by replacing the libertarian freedom of the free-will defense with another concept.
Response: This critique does not replace libertarian freedom but clarifies its purpose. The ultimate purpose of freedom is not to remain in a state of indecision between good and evil. Its purpose is to achieve its proper end: The Good. The ability to choose evil is an accidental property of an imperfect will, not an essential component of freedom itself. Instead of diminishing freedom, the removal of a defect completes freedom.
The unfalsifiable premise of relationship: Finally, one might assert that the premise of a “freely chosen, loving relationship” is an unfalsifiable, ad hoc solution.
Response: The premise of a relational God is not an ad hoc fix. It’s a foundational axiom of theism. The problem of evil is a “problem” only if one begins with the premise that God is all-powerful and also perfectly good and loving (i.e., relational). To question this premise is to shift the debate from the problem of evil to the fundamental nature of God. The existence of freedom and the process of sanctification are logical extensions of this core theological claim.
Conclusion
The “Problem of Heaven” proceeds from a mistaken premise. When freedom is understood as the capacity for a will to pursue its proper end—a relationship with God, who is The Good—the apparent contradiction dissolves. Divine grace acts as an empowerment of the will, not its negation. A will that freely orients itself toward God is not made less free when God supplies the strength to achieve what it already desires. This act heals and perfects the will, allowing it to attain the end for which it was made.
Image credit
Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy, and Nick Trakakis, “Salvation in Heaven?” (2003), https://www.academia.edu/23446266/Salvation_in_Heaven.
This doesn’t require that God must create. It’s possible that the objects of God’s reasons for creating or not could have been different.