Against a One-Size-Fits-All Problem of Evil
Authors David and Randall Basinger argue that the GENERIC PROBLEM of evil fails to present a serious challenge to theistic belief.
In the 1994 article "The Problem with the 'Problem of Evil,'" authors David and Randall Basinger argue that "the GENERIC PROBLEM" of evil fails to present a serious challenge to theistic belief. They state that the generic problem is usually framed by this syllogism:1
An omnipotent being could ensure that no evil occurred.
A perfectly good being would never desire (seek to bring about) the occurrence of evil.
But evil occurs in our world.
Therefore, the theist cannot justifiably affirm the existence of a being who is omnipotent and perfectly good.
The Basingers claim that most philosophical discussions still center around this formulation, but they should not. Their argument is that the syllogism does not capture what most theists actually believe. Theists who affirm God's omnipotence and perfect goodness do not all affirm (1), (2), or (3) in the same way.
The Basinger's first points out that it is simply not the case that all theists who believe in an omnipotent, perfectly good God accept number (1) or (2) of the syllogism. Nor do they necessarily accept (3) without important qualifications. Because of this, it is wrong to assume that the generic problem equally challenges all theistic systems.
On the topic of omnipotence, the Basingers explain that many theists disagree about what it means. Some believe omnipotence means God can do absolutely anything. Others, following philosophers like Thomas V. Morris, argue that omnipotence does not include doing the logically impossible. God cannot make a square circle, and God cannot grant a creature significant freedom while also guaranteeing that the creature always uses it rightly2.
So the Basingers claim many theists reject premise (1) as stated. They hold that if God grants meaningful freedom, He cannot also ensure that no evil results from that freedom, at least from those who are yet to be sanctified.
The article also discusses different views of perfect goodness. Most agree that God never acts contrary to true moral principles, but the Basingers show there is disagreement about what these principles are.
Some see moral principles deontologically: right actions are determined by rules, not consequences. Others view them teleologically: right actions are those that fulfill a purpose or natural end, while others are conventional consequentialists who favor the best overall outcomes.
The Basingers point out that these differences affect how theists respond to (2). Some think a perfectly good God would never desire evil at all. Others think God might allow evils if they contribute to better overall outcomes or prevent worse states of affairs. What it means for God to be good is not a settled question among theists.
Regarding evil itself (premise 3), the Basingers stress that most theists distinguish between gratuitous evil (evil without justification) and nongratuitous evil (evil that is necessary for some greater good or duty). Some theists argue that there is no gratuitous evil in the world. Others leave open the possibility that there might be some. Thus, even the affirmation that "evil occurs" is more complicated than the syllogism suggests.
The authors' main claim is that the generic problem of evil does not define its terms carefully. It ignores the real diversity in theistic belief about God’s power, goodness, and the nature of evil. Because of that, the generic problem should not remain the center of philosophical discussions.
Instead, the authors argue that philosophers should focus directly on specific theistic systems. They should ask how each system defines omnipotence, perfect goodness, and evil, and evaluate those definitions in light of the existence of suffering and wrongdoing in the world.
When philosophers center the discussion around the generic problem, both critics and theists can avoid serious challenges. Critics act as if all theists must solve the same problem, leading to accusations of ad hoc solutions. Theists can claim easy victories by rejecting ambiguities, without having to explain how their actual beliefs handle the existence of evil. Neither case helps to develop understanding.
The Basingers also claim that this misuse of the generic problem makes it seem like the real debate is simply between theists and atheists. But, they argue, the real debates happen between people who hold different views about God's attributes, including theists who critique each other’s systems.
According to the authors, meaningful discussions about the problem of evil happen most often when one theist challenges another theist’s account of God's goodness and power. In these cases, both sides are forced to define their terms and deal honestly with how their views handle the reality of evil.
The article concludes by stressing that evil may still present serious challenges to specific theological systems. Theists must still explain how their beliefs about God’s nature fit with the world’s evils. But the philosophical community would serve itself better if it stopped acting as if there were one generic problem that all theists must face in the same way. Instead of focusing on an ambiguous, oversimplified syllogism, the real work lies in examining specific understandings of omnipotence, perfect goodness, and evil within each theistic system.
Image credit
David Basinger and Randall Basinger, “The Problem with the ‘Problem of Evil,’” Faith and Philosophy 11, no. 4 (1994): 482–503, https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVTPW-8.
See a syllogism of mine supporting this limitation on omnipotence linked here.