Sterba's Logical Problem of Evil
In a video titled “Sterba’s NEW Logical Problem of Evil,” philosopher Christopher Cloos (@drcloos) examines a challenge to traditional theism presented by philosopher James Sterba. The discussion centers on how the existence of specific, horrendous harms creates a logical contradiction for the belief in an omnipotent and morally perfect God. Sterba focuses on the prevention of the worst outcomes rather than the existence of any evil whatsoever.
Defining horrendous evils
The video identifies horrendous evils as experiences that threaten to overwhelm a person’s life. Marilyn McCord Adams defined these as evils that make a person doubt whether their life is a good to them. Examples include the violent death of a child or prolonged torture. Sterba focuses on these because they represent a threshold where a victim loses the capacity to find meaning. These evils involve primary harm to the victim and moral damage to the perpetrator.
Theists respond that human judgment of a life’s total value is incomplete. You cannot see the full scope of an existence if that existence continues after death. From a divine perspective, a period of horrendous suffering is a finite segment of an infinite life. If God provides an infinite good in the future, the suffering does not necessarily make the life as a whole not worth living. This view relies on the assumption that an afterlife compensates for earthly tragedy.
The three moral prevention principles
Sterba bases his logic on three principles that he believes any moral agent must follow. These mirror the requirements placed on human moral actors.
The first principle states that an agent must prevent significant or horrendous evil when it is easy to do so without violating rights. For example, if you see a child being kidnapped and have the power to stop it without harm to yourself, you are morally obligated to act. Sterba argues that God, being omnipotent, always has the power to stop such events without effort.
The second principle forbids permitting horrendous evil to provide a good that the beneficiary would morally prefer not to have. This targets the idea that God lets people suffer so they can achieve spiritual growth. Sterba suggests that most victims would choose to avoid torture rather than receive the spiritual benefit that supposedly follows.
The third principle states that an agent must not permit horrendous evil to give a victim a good they have no right to if there are other ways to provide that good. This challenges the idea that suffering is a necessary path to specific divine rewards.
Theists argue that God’s intervention in every horrendous event is not easily done. Constant intervention would require God to suspend the laws of physics or overwrite human biology. This would make human choices inconsequential. If God stops every hand that attempts a violent act, humans do not possess the power to shape their own environment or moral character. This results in a world of puppets rather than free agents.
The logical inconsistency
Sterba presents five propositions that cannot all be true. If a morally perfect and omnipotent being exists, that being follows the prevention principles. If that being follows those principles, horrendous evil consequences of human actions do not occur. Since these consequences occur in the world, Sterba concludes that a morally perfect and omnipotent being does not exist.
Theists often respond by challenging the idea that God is a moral agent in the same way humans are. Humans have duties to each other because they are equals in a shared society. If God is the creator, his relationship to humanity is not one of equality. His actions are governed by standards of goodness that do not translate into the specific duties outlined in Sterba’s principles. This is known as skeptical theism, which suggests that human moral intuition is too limited to judge divine behavior.
Dr. Cloos’ insights and possible exceptions
The second principle is the most contested point in the video. Cloos notes that Richard Swinburne argues Principle 2 must allow for exceptions. Swinburne suggests that God permits a victim to suffer if it provides a unique opportunity for that victim to exercise patience or for others to show heroic compassion. Swinburne believes the good of having a significant choice between helping or harming others outweighs the bad of the harm itself.
Cloos highlights that the argument often shifts toward a “God of love” rather than a God of “moral perfection.” He suggests that the nature of a loving relationship might change how we view divine intervention. A loving parent permits a child to face certain dangers to facilitate growth, though Sterba argues this does not apply to horrendous harms where growth is no longer possible for the victim.
A missing fourth principle?
From my perspective, Sterba is missing a fourth prevention principle indicates that a moral agent has no obligation to take an action to prevent harm when that action will generate equal or greater evils. The purpose of this principle is to limit the moral obligation to act on behalf of another in order to be sure the moral agent has taken into account all long-range effects of their actions. In the context of the logical problem of evil, this principle suggests that God’s regular intervention to stop horrendous harms would create a new set of systemic evils.
If God intervened to stop every instance of horrendous evil, he would establish a predictable pattern of divine interference. This pattern would remove the natural consequences of human choices. When actions no longer produce their natural effects, the world becomes unintelligible. Humans would lose the ability to learn from the environment or understand the stakes of their moral decisions. A world where gravity or biology shifts whenever a person intends harm is a world where scientific law and human agency cannot function.
The evil of losing human agency by regular intervention is arguably greater than the evil of the individual harms God would prevent. Significant freedom requires that the world remains stable and that human will can cause real change. If God consistently blocked the results of immoral choices, he would be forced to take over the management of human life entirely. Humans would be reduced to residents of a controlled environment where no growth or genuine responsibility is possible.
This defense suggests that God permits horrendous evil not because he lacks the power to stop it, but because the alternative—a world of constant intervention—is a greater evil. A predictable world with the possibility of disaster is morally preferable to a safe world where human will has no meaning. Under this principle, God’s regular silence is a necessary condition for maintaining a reality where humans are distinct, responsible actors.
Areas for further discussion
Extending of human ethics to the divine
Consider whether it is logical to apply human moral constraints to an infinite being. If God is the author of the moral law, is he also subject to it? Some philosophers argue that if God is not bound by the same moral rules as humans, the word “good” loses its meaning when applied to him. Others argue that God’s primary goal is the preservation of agency, which requires a non-interventionist approach to even the worst human choices.
Informed consent in suffering
Sterba’s second principle brings up the issue of consent. In medical ethics, you cannot perform a painful medical procedure on someone who the medical professionals are justified in believing would not consent, even if it benefits them, unless there are extraordinary circumstances like diminished capacity or public health. If God allows a person to suffer a horrendous evil for a greater good without asking them, he appears to violate this ethical standard. However, if God is present at all moments, then God knows the contingent truth that the victim grants permission after the fact.
Probability of soul-making goods
The soul-making defense suggests that horrendous evils are necessary for the development of virtues like courage and empathy. Does a genocide produce enough virtue to justify its occurrence? If the virtues produced are less than the harm caused, the theistic defense becomes harder to maintain.
Impact of a divine safety net
A further concern is the psychological impact of a world where God prevents all horrendous evil. If God always intervened to stop the most serious crimes, would humans still take their moral choices seriously? Without the possibility of failing each other in horrendous ways, our successes in protecting each other might become trivial.