Permitting Evil Isn’t Indifference
The Logical Problem of Evil (LPOE) asks if God’s existence is logically inconsistent with the presence of evil. The Free Will Defense counters this by asserting that the superior good of creaturely freedom logically necessitates the possibility of immoral actions. This defense, however, immediately generates a new challenge. Even if the logic of freedom works, a skeptic can pivot to challenge the moral plausibility of the defense. The skeptical claim is simple: even if the logic permits evil, God’s nature forbids indifference to evil.
It’s saying that even if the logic works out, the morality doesn’t, according the theist’s own lights. If the permission of any evil is logically necessary, God’s opposition to that permitted evil is never acted upon in any possible world, meaning God is effectively indifferent to that specific act of evil in the morally relevant, action-guiding sense.
If logical necessity requires God not prevent a given act of evil, then God’s opposition doesn't rationalize any action against that act of evil. A desire or stance that never rationalizes action is dismissed as morally inert, or indifferent. But an all-good being is never indifferent to evil.
As a syllogism, the challenge of indifference might be represented as:
P1. God doesn’t act to prevent Evil S (which could be some given major or minor immoral act).
P2. If true, then God is indifferent to Evil S.
C1. Therefore, God is indifferent to Evil S, which means God does not oppose all evil. (modus ponens)
P3. Being all good is to oppose to all evil.
C2. Therefore, God is not good. (modus tollens)
The argument is logically valid (as in the conclusion naturally follows if the premises are sound), but are the premises sound? I think each of the premises are open to serious challenge.
For the sake discussion, the defense I will employ is that God’s morally sufficient reason for permitting evil is to create a community of mutually loving perfected wills in union with God (“The Perfected Community”). This creates the condition where as a matter of logical consistency, God permits evil to achieve this goal.1 This isn’t to say that God permits every possible evil. It is only to show that it is consistent with a loving God to permit at least some evils, which is enough to overcome the LPOE.
P1. God doesn’t act to prevent Evil S
The first premise is false because it assumes that the only way God can prevent Evil S (some specific act of moral evil) is by direct coercion, but this overlooks indirect ways that God acts to prevent the Evil S by limiting its effects without violating the logical requirement of a mutually loving community of saints in union with God (The Perfected Community).
For example, God could providentially arrange for a person’s good habits to strengthen their resistance to a specific temptation, or ensure a third party’s intervention, which limits the evil’s effect without coercive force.
God acts to ensure Evil S does not succeed in destroying The Perfected Community. This action preserves The Perfected Community, while still permitting Evil S.
Retributive Reversal
Consider an individual who commits an act of betrayal driven by a corrupted will. This action fulfills the required possibility of non-good action, but God must prevent it from escalating into permanent separation that prevents The Perfected Community. God uses the natural consequences of the betrayal (some of which flow from the natural laws) to limit the damage and issue a warning of Retributive Reversal.
The betrayed person suffers, and the betrayer is immediately cut off from the mutual trust they once enjoyed (”live by the sword, die by the sword”). This consequence is a Retributive Reversal. It is not an arbitrary punishment, but the logical breakdown of the free, moral community. This suffering is the mechanism that restricts betrayal from expanding easily. It confronts the betrayer with the reality that betrayal is self-destructive.
The painful consequence serves as a warning that limits the will’s ability to remain comfortably in sin. It prevents the soul from gliding smoothly toward The Perfected Community by demonstrating the immoral path leads only to isolation.
Redemptive Reversal
God uses the possibility of a moral response to evil to offer a path back to the relationship: Redemptive Reversal.
The victim of the betrayal responds with genuine forgiveness rather than justified vengeance (”the last shall be first, and the first shall be last”). This action is a Redemptive Reversal. It shows the betrayer an image of selfless love and provides an opportunity for repentance. This external grace invites the betrayer’s will to orient itself to no longer resist the good.
When the betrayer’s will responds, God’s grace supplies what is missing—the strength to overcome the internal deficiency that caused the betrayal. This consensual assistance is a form of cooperative prevention that limits evil’s power to destroy the soul, guiding the creature back toward mutual relationship.
By turning permitted harm (the initial betrayal) into a structured warning and an invitation, God is actively engaged in strategic governance that actively prevents its maximal effect, proving P1 is false.
P2. If true, then God is indifferent to Evil S.
Indifference means a lack of moral concern. Even if it were the case that God doesn’t even indirectly act to prevent an evil, it doesn’t follow that inaction would stem from apathy.
A common moral intuition is that allowing a lesser evil is morally justworthy if it’s the best or only logically possible means of avoiding a greater evil. This doesn’t mean the lesser evil is necessary or of instrumental value. It could still be best (all things considered) if the lesser evil never occurred and any eventual good is accomplished in spite of the lesser evil, not because of it.
The permission of evils is not a statement of indifference toward Evil S; it is consistent with a statement of maximal commitment to The Perfected Community.
P3. Being all good is to oppose to all evil.
The third premise is flawed because it imposes an eliminative and destructive definition of opposition onto God’s nature.
The premise defines goodness solely by its destructive capacity—its opposition to what exists. This fails to account for God’s primary attribute: Being Itself and the ultimate source of all existence.
Saint Anselm held that True Good does not seek to destroy but rather to create and preserve. If God were obliged to eliminate everything He opposes, He would be a force of non-being, contradicting His identity as the source of all being.
In the metaphysical sense, evil has a real effect in the world. But ontologically, evil is a deficiency or an absence of what is due. One doesn’t “oppose” a deficiency; one restores the missing good. God’s true opposition is not the attempt to annihilate a substance (which evil is not), but the commitment to restore the integrity of every being in the created order.
The charge that God is indifferent to evil is defeated because the decision to permit evil is characterized as an active, strategic choice rooted in supreme moral concern.
This perspective is fundamentally aligned with the insights of Saint Anselm.
Anselm rejects the idea that good must eliminate evil. God’s nature is defined by creation and restoration, not destruction. The elimination of evil is achieved by restoring the good that was lost (since evil is a privation of good), a process that necessitates the permitted conditions of struggle.
God permits evil not from powerlessness, but because “eliminating it entirely would remove the very conditions that allow for redemption, free will and eternal union with Him,” as I’ve written before. These conditions are the prerequisites for the community of mutually loving sanctified wills.
God’s opposition is rationally expressed through commitment to justice and redemption, after the evil occurs. The existence of evil, far from refuting the goodness of God, defines the heroic scale of His commitment to a final, perfected creation.
The defense I offered argues that God’s choice is based on a rational, moral hierarchy: the opposition to immoral acts is subordinated to the greater, eternal value of the community of sanctified wills. The ultimate good is a freely chosen, loving relationship.
A more fitting understanding of “being all good” with respect to God means God’s will is perfectly and necessarily aligned with His own nature (the Good). The definition is a metaphysical one, not a naturalistic one. It does not derive an “ought” (a moral value) from an “is” (a natural fact). ”Being” and “good” describe the same reality but with different emphasis. “Being” refers to a thing simply as existing. It is a statement of fact. “Good” refers to the same existing thing, but views it in relation to its perfection (it lack potentiality yet to be realized). This is why every single thing that exists, insofar as it exists, is good. Its existence is a participation in the ultimate Good (God), who is identical with Being Itself.
Since God acts strategically to limit the scope of evil and cooperatively to limit the power of evil, the premise that God is indifferent to evil is false.
To fully rebutt this charge, a defense to the LPOE must establish that God’s decision to permit evil is based not on a contingent limitation of power, but is a logical necessity of securing a specific, ultimate, and maximally valuable end for humans.
The insufficiency of contingent solutions
A contingent necessity refers to a trade-off where some good requires an evil act due to the practical, physical, or psychological structure of the world, but not due to the inherent nature of the concepts themselves.
God’s omnipotence attribute imposes a strict requirement: any permissive action by God based on a mere contingent link is untenable.
Consider a doctor administering a painful treatment to save a life. The pain is contingently necessary because the doctor lacks the power to instantly and painlessly cure the disease. For an omnipotent God, this contingent link must be decoupled. A wholly good being with infinite power for what is logically possible would simply actualize the good without the associated contingent pain. God is not bound by the physical laws or practical limitations that constrain human agents.
If there are logically possible solutions to achieve some good without evil, a moral agent is bound to choose the best one or best kind of them if there were no single best. The act of permitting evil to achieve a good is only defensible if that permission is itself the best possible solution among all logically possible alternatives. If a less worse immoral alternative exists, God’s permission of the evil implies indifference to the suffering. This forces the defense to show that God’s choice of permitting evil is logically necessary, not merely one of several contingent options.
A caution
I recognize this argument is highly conceptual and can feel detached from the visceral reality of suffering. My intent is not to explain away the pain of evil, but to test the logical consistency of a specific theological claim, knowing these philosophical tools offer no comfort for actual loss.
This is my attempt to think through a difficult problem. I am open to the charge that I have misunderstood the objection or that my defense creates new problems. This framework is an exploration, not a final verdict, and I invite discussion on its weaknesses.
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If God were to create beings psychologically incapable of choosing anything but The Good, their connection to God (who is The Good) would be automatic, not authentic. Their actions would be an extension of God’s will, not a mutual response of love. Therefore, a mutually cooperative process of sanctification of the will is a rational necessity for achieving the maximal value of a consensual and freely chosen relationship. Preventing the exercise of immoral acts is logically inconsistent with this goal of forming a community of mutually loving perfected wills in union with God, as it would destroy the authentic freedom necessary for the ultimate goal.